Secrecy transmission is investigated for a cooperative jamming scheme, where a multi-antenna jammer generates artificial noise (AN) to confuse eavesdroppers. Two kinds of eavesdroppers are considered:
Active and passive eavesdroppers, cooperative jamming, power allocation, secrecy rate maximization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security (PLS) techniques have attracted tremendous research attention in the past decade. Different from the conventional encryption methods, PLS can achieve positive secrecy rate without a predetermined secrecy key [1] . Many approaches have been proposed to enhance the secrecy performance of PLS. For example, multiple antennas and relay techniques are often deployed to enhance the reception performance at the legitimate receiver. On the other hand, artificial noise (AN) and cooperative jamming can be deployed to degrade the reception performance at the eavesdropper. When there is a high secrecy rate requirement or when the eavesdropper channel quality is better than the legitimate channel quality, AN and cooperative jamming become attractive schemes to secure transmission [2] - [4] .
A plethora of works have investigated beamforming with AN under different secrecy goals and different transmission scenarios. For instance, when transmit beamforming is deployed at the multi-antenna transmitter, the achievable secrecy rate [5] , [6] , the secrecy outage probability (SOP) [7] , and the secrecy throughput [8] , [9] can be improved by optimizing the power allocation between the information signal and AN. Under both secrecy and transmission outage constraints, an on-off AN scheme was investigated to maximize the effective secrecy throughput in [10] , [11] , where fully adaptive AN schemes, i.e, adaptive transmission rate and adaptive secrecy rate, were proposed. By contrast, a partial adaptive AN scheme was proposed in [12] for a fixed secrecy rate and a varying transmission rate. The results in [12] indicate that the partial adaptive scheme outperforms the on-off scheme, and can achieve almost the same secrecy performance as the fully adaptive scheme. In addition, when a normal user and a secure user 1 coexist in a cellular network [13] , under the constraint of average throughput for the normal user, the effective secrecy throughputs for the non-adaptive and fully adaptive AN schemes were maximized by the optimal power allocation among the secure user, AN, and the normal user.
In addition, due to feedback overhead [14] , time-varying channels [15] and imperfect channel state information (CSI) estimation [5] , [7] , AN towards the eavesdroppers can be leaked to the legitimate receiver. Moreover, for the case of imperfect CSI, optimal power allocation between the legitimate information signal and AN was also studied in [5] , [7] for high reliability and security transmission.
When multiple antennas are not available at the transmitter and the AN technique cannot be used, a friendly jammer can be employed to degrade the eavesdropper channel. Without the eavesdroppers' instantaneous CSI, a joint jamming and beamforming design was considered in [16] , [17] , where the jammer equipped with beamforming injects AN into the null space of the legitimate receiver. Similarly, multiple single antenna jammers can cooperatively form the transmit beamforming and inject AN towards the eavesdroppers [18] , [19] . These works assumed that transmit beamforming was applied at a multi-antenna jammer or multiple singleantenna jammers. Different from these works, a new jamming scheme was proposed without transmit beamforming in [20] , while multiple jammers cooperatively transmit the noise towards the legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers. Moreover, to reduce the system complexity, one 'best' jammer that has the minimum noise power at the legitimate receiver was selected to forward the AN under both perfect and imperfect CSI assumptions [21] .
The aforementioned works assumed that the eavesdroppers' instantaneous CSIs were unavailable at the legitimate transmitter and the jammer. These eavesdroppers can be considered as the passive eavesdroppers, who overhear legitimate messages silently. However, besides the passive eavesdropper, recently several works have considered the active eavesdropper who can transmit malicious jamming signals and receive legitimate signals simultaneously [22] - [26] . Similarly, when multiple antennas were deployed at the active eavesdropper and legitimate receiver, the power minimization and secrecy rate maximization problems were solved in [27] , [28] . In addition, to circumvent the imperfect CSI issues, robust techniques were introduced in [29]- [31] , where cooperative jamming schemes were designed based on the worst-case secrecy rate.
In practice, the eavesdroppers can cooperate to overhear the legitimate information. For example, in a wireless network, active eavesdroppers may intentionally expose themselves to attract the legitimate user's attention by injecting AN. Simultaneously, passive eavesdroppers overhear the legitimate information silently. Considering the active eavesdroppers or the passive eavesdroppers alone cannot achieve the maximum secrecy rate [32] , [33] and the secure performance cannot be guaranteed. Hence, for the legitimate user, it is necessary to design the secrecy transmission scheme considering both the active eavesdropper and passive eavesdropper. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no prior work focusing on secrecy rate maximization when both active and passive eavesdroppers coexist in a wireless network. Hence, we propose a cooperative The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model and presents a cooperative jamming scheme for secrecy transmission. Section III formulates an optimization problem to maximize the secrecy rate, and proposes a numerical method to solve the optimization problem. In Section IV, optimizing the transmit power allocation between the information signal and AN is investigated with imperfect CSI. In Section V, the cooperative jamming scheme is proposed when there are multiple active eavesdroppers in the network.
Numerical results are presented and discussed in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
Notations-(·) T , (·) * and (·) H denote the transpose, conjugate, and conjugate transpose, respectively; · denotes the Frobenius norm. We consider the wireless network shown in Fig. 1 
J,E k I N denote the instantaneous CSI of the jammer → Bob, the jammer → E a , and the jammer → E k links, respectively. We assume that the instantaneous CSI of g Ea , and the statistical CSI of g E k are available at Alice and the jammer, which is a reasonable assumption since the active eavesdropper injects AN towards Bob, while the passive eavesdroppers overhear the message silently.
III. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION FOR SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
There are two main schemes for secrecy rate maximization, namely, adaptive schemes and nonadaptive schemes [13] , [34] . Though an adaptive scheme can make full use of the wireless channel and improve the secrecy capacity, it increases the receiver complexity due to frequent change in the secrecy code rate. Moreover, since an adaptive scheme requires continuous change of the transmit power and thus has a higher complexity, we adopt a more practical and low-complexity non-adaptive scheme where the transmission rate R b and secrecy rate R s are fixed during the transmission. For the non-adaptive scheme, it is challenging to jointly optimize the beamforming coefficients and power allocation under a secrecy outage constraint. We will therefore first design a suboptimal beamforming scheme in the presence of both passive and active eavesdroppers.
Then, based on the proposed beamforming scheme, we investigate the optimal power allocation between the legitimate signal, the AN for the active eavesdropper and the AN for the passive eavesdroppers.
A. A Two-fold Zero-forcing Beamforming Scheme
In the presence of both active and passive eavesdroppers, we propose a two-fold zero-forcing beamforming applied at the multi-antenna jammer J. More specifically, the AN injected towards the active eavesdropper will not interfere with Bob. In addition, the AN injected towards the passive eavesdropper will not interfere with Bob, as well as the active eavesdropper, because a separate AN signal has already been injected towards it based on instantaneous CSI between Jammer and the active eavesdropper. The proposed scheme makes a full use of the instantaneous CSI of the jammer → Bob and the jammer → E a links. Specifically, the jammer adopts MRT to maximize the AN power at the active eavesdropper. Thus, the beamforming vector for the active eavesdropper W Ea ∈ C N ×1 should lie in the null-space of g B , and it is given by
(
At the same time, since there are multiple passive eavesdroppers, the beamforming matrix for the passive eavesdroppers, W Ep ∈ C N ×(N −2) , must be designed to enhance secrecy performance.
On the one hand, to avoid interfering with Bob, W Ep should also lie in the null space of g B .
On the other hand, since we have precisely injected AN to the active eavesdropper by MRT,
beamforming for the passive eavesdroppers should remove the dimension corresponding to the active eavesdropper. Hence, W Ep should lie in the null-space of [g B , W Ea ]. Moreover, since the instantaneous CSI of the jammer → E k link is unavailable, the AN power for the passive eavesdroppers, P J P , is uniformly allocated to N − 2 dimensions [35] . Thus the transmitted AN vector n J ∈ C N ×1 is given by
where P J A denotes the AN power for the active eavesdropper. In addition, n J A ∼ CN (0, 1) and
denote the injected AN for the active eavesdropper and the passive eavesdroppers, respectively. Then, the received signals at the active eavesdropper E a and the passive eavesdropper E k are, respectively, given by
and
where P A is the transmit power at Alice. In addition, n Ea ∼ CN (0, 1) and n E k ∼ CN (0, 1), respectively, denote the noises at the active eavesdropper E a and the passive eavesdropper E k .
Since all the eavesdroppers cooperatively overhear the legitimate information, the interference generated by E a is assumed to be perfectly cancelled at E k and E a by using advanced analog and digital interference cancellation methods [36] , [37] ;
Now, we derive the CDFs of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the active eavesdropper, denoted as γ Ea and the passive eavesdroppers, denoted as γ E k (1 ≤ k ≤ K). Assume that the interference generated by the jammer dominates the noise power at the active eavesdropper, i.e., σ 2 J,Ea
1.
Thus, according to (3), γ Ea can be written as
Thus, the ratio
) follows an F -distribution having degrees of freedom (2, 2(N − 1)), which is denoted by F (2,2(N −1)) , and the CDF of γ Ea is given by
Similarly, according to (4) , the SNR at the k-th passive eavesdropper E k is expressed as
Since
, the CDF of the passive eavesdropper E k is given by [38] . In addition, the received signal at Bob is expressed as
where x is the information symbol having unit power. n a ∼ CN (0, 1) denotes the AN transmitted from E a , and P Ea denotes the transmission power at the active eavesdropper. In addition, n B denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob having mean zero and variance N 0 = 1. Assume that the interference power at the legitimate receiver is much greater than the noise power, i.e., an interference-limited environment for the legitimate receiver. Then, according to (9) , the SNR at Bob is expressed as
(11)
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
For the cooperative jamming scheme, both the transmission and secrecy quality should be satisfied. To guarantee the transmission quality, the transmission outage probability requirements should be less than a predetermined threshold δ. Simultaneously, to guarantee the secrecy transmission, the SOPs for both the active eavesdropper and the passive eavesdroppers should be less than a predetermined threshold ε. Thus, to maximize the secrecy rate R s under reliability and security transmission requirements, we formulate the optimization problem as follows
where (12b) and (12c) denote the reliable transmission constraint and secrecy transmission constraint, respectively. In addition, eq. (12d) is the total power constraint. p to is the transmission outage probability and it is given by
Let
Then, according to (6) , the SOP for the active eavesdropper E a , is expressed as
In addition, since it is challenging for the passive eavesdroppers to acquire the perfect instantaneous CSIs of the jammer → E k links, the eavesdropper that has the maximum SNR overhears the legitimate message at each time slot. Then, according to (8) , the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers is given by
∂P A > 0, both p so 1 and p so 2 increase with P A . Also, since ∂pso 1 ∂Rs > 0 and ∂pso 2 ∂Rs > 0, both p so 1 and p so 2 increase with R s .
C. Parameter Optimization for Secrecy Rate Maximization
It can be shown that both p so 1 and p so 2 are monotonous increasing functions with P A and R s .
Thus, to maximize R s , we should first derive the minimum required P A . According to (12b) and (13) , the minimum power allocated to Alice is given by
It is clear that if P * A > P max , there is no solution to (12a). After determining the optimal power P * A , we can rewrite the optimization problem in (12a) as
In (17), the first-order derivative of p so 1 with respect to (w.r.t.) θ is given by
Obviously 1 − N ≤ 0 and ∂pso 1 ∂θ < 0. This means that there is a monotonous relationship between p so 1 and θ, i.e., p so 1 decreases with θ. Then, according to the SOP requirement at the active eavesdropper, θ should satisfy the following constraint
In addition, the first-order derivative of p so 2 w.r.t. θ is derived as
It can be shown that
Thus, for a fixed secrecy rate R s and a fixed transmission power P A , p so 2 is a convex function of θ, and p so 2 is minimized when θ = 1 N −1 . Assume ϕ (P A , R s ) is the inverse function of p so 2 . Since p so 2 is a convex function of θ, there are two θ values satisfying p so 2 = ε, namely, the smaller value min (ϕ (P A , R s )) and the larger value max (ϕ (P A , R s )). When ε is large, min (ϕ (P A , R s )) can be less than zero and max (ϕ (P A , R s )) can be larger than unity.
However, θ has been defined as the ratio of P J A to P max − P A and has a range between zero and unity. Thus, to satisfy p so 2 ≤ ε, θ is given by max (0, min (ϕ (P A , R s ))) < θ < min (1, max (ϕ (P A , R s ))) .
Note that if p so 2 > ε when θ = 1 N −1 , Eq. (21) is satisfied and there is no solution to (12a).
According to (16) , (19) , and (21), the maximum secrecy rate can be obtained by Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, ∆ denotes the incremental step for R s , and it can be determined by the required R s accuracy. In addition, we have the following remarks regarding Algorithm 1.
2: According to (16) , the optimal power allocated to Alice P * A can be obtained. 3: Set i = 1, R s = 0, 4: Calculate the constraint (19) and (21) if ψ (P * A , R s ) < min (1, max (ϕ (P * A , R s ))), R s = R s + ∆, else break;
, or there is no solution for the constraints in (17). Remark 3: Under the secrecy outage constraint, there is no monotonous relationship between the AN power for the passive eavesdroppers and σ 2 J,E k . Specifically, when the passive eavesdropper is close to the jammer, θ * approaches unity. It is noted that the optimal θ * corresponding to the maximum secrecy rate is equal to 1/(N − 1), which also corresponds to the minimum value of SOP for the passive eavesdroppers. This means that the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers dominates the maximum secrecy rate and the SOP for the active eavesdropper is negligible.
In addition, since p so 1 is a monotonous function of both R s and θ, Algorithm 1 stops when θ = 1 cannot satisfy the p so 1 constraint. By contrast, since p so 2 is a convex function of θ, Algorithm 1 stops only when there is no solution for θ that satisfies SOP constraints. February 19, 2020 DRAFT 
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION WITH IMPERFECT CSI
In our proposed jamming scheme, the beamforming vector depends on the CSI of the jammer to Bob and the active eavesdropper links. However, it is challenging to acquire the perfect CSI due to feedback delay or estimation error. Therefore, we will investigate the impact of imperfect g B and imperfect g Ea on the maximum secrecy rate in the following subsections.
A. Imperfect CSI Between Jammer and Bob
Assume that the instantaneous CSI g B cannot be perfectly estimated at the jammer, and g B ∼ CN 0, σ 2 J,B I N denotes the imperfect CSI between the jammer and Bob. The relationship between g B andg B is expressed as [39] 
where e B ∼ CN 0, (1 − ρ 2 B ) σ 2 J,B I N denotes the estimation error for g B , and ρ B is the correlation coefficient between g B andg B . Sinceg B only determines the null-space of W Ea and W Ep , it will not affect the SNR at both the active eavesdropper and the passive eavesdroppers, which have the same expressions as (5) and (7), respectively. However due to imperfect CSIg B , the AN generated to interfere with the eavesdroppers will leak to Bob, and the SNR at Bob is modified toγ
where W H Ea e B 2 follows an exponential distribution having parameter (1 − ρ 2 B ) σ 2 J,B . The ratio 2 WH Ep e B (1−ρ 2 B )σ 2 J,B follows a chi-square distribution having n degrees of freedom χ 2 (2(N − 2)). [7] , and an upper bound onγ B is expressed asγ
Using (24), we obtain the transmission outage probability as follows
Substituting (25) into (12b), we derive the required transmission power at Alice as
where 0 < ρ B < 1. From (26), we can obtain the minimum required power at Alice as P *
. Once P * A is obtained, we can still use Algorithm 1 to obtain the maximum secrecy rate R * s . This is due to the fact that the SOPs for the active and passive eavesdroppers have the same expressions as (14) and (15), respectively. Also, when ρ B = 1, the optimal parameters, θ * and P * A , have the same values as in the perfect CSI case. When ρ B = 0, the jammer cannot obtain the instantaneous CSI between the jammer and Bob, which means that more AN will leak to Bob, and more power is required at Alice to satisfy (12b).
B. Imperfect CSI Between Jammer and The Active Eavesdropper
In practice, the instantaneous CSI between the jammer and the active eavesdropper can also be imperfect, which we assume to be described asg Ea ∼ CN 0, σ 2 J,Ea I N . The relationship between g Ea andg Ea is given by
where e Ea ∼ CN 0, 1 − ρ 2 Ea σ 2 J,Ea I N denotes the estimation error for g Ea , and ρ Ea is the correlation coefficient betweeng Ea and g Ea . SinceW Ea = 
whereW
, the CDF ofγ E k has the same expression as (8) . Thus, the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers p so 2 has the same expression as (15) . Thoughg Ea does not change the SNRs at Bob and the passive eavesdroppers, it affects the SNR at the active eavesdropper. The SOP for the active eavesdropper is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Withg Ea , the SOP for the active eavesdropper is given by
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix A. When ρ Ea = 1, Eq. (29) specializes to (14) . After obtaining the expression of p so 1 , we quantify the impact of R s , P A and θ on p so 1 in the following lemma Lemma 2: With fixed P A , R s , and θ, p so 1 decreases with ρ Ea , while with fixed P A and θ, p so 1 increases with R s . In addition, with fixed R s and θ, p so 1 increases with P A . With fixed P A and R s , when θ 2 , the positive solution of ∂Pso 1 ∂θ = 0, is larger than unity,
The proof is presented in Appendix B. Note that when p so 1 = ε, we can obtain
is the inverse function of p so 1 . Though ς (R s , P A ) can be less than zero or greater than unity, a reasonable value of θ should lie between zero and unity. Then according to Lemma 2, to satisfy the constraint p so 1 ≤ ε, two cases arise according to (55).
Case 1: Eq. (55) is satisfied, which means that p so 1 decreases with θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). Then, to satisfy the requirement of p so 1 ≤ ε, the range of θ is
where ς (R s , P A ) ≤ 1 is required.
Case 2: Eq. (55) is not satisfied. Then, p so 1 ≤ ε is a convex function of θ, where p so 1 decreases with θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ θ 2 ) and increases with θ (θ 2 ≤ θ ≤ 1). Thus, if p so 1 = ε, there are two solutions for θ, namely, min (ς (R s , P A )) and max (ς (R s , P A )). To satisfy the requirement of p so 1 ≤ ε, the range of θ is
For fixed R s and P A , if there is no θ that satisfies (30) 2: According to (16) , the optimal power allocated to Alice P * A can be obtained. 3 to the case of perfect g Ea , p so 1 decreases with θ when N goes to infinity or σ 2 J,Ea /σ 2 A,Ea goes to infinity. In this case, Eq. (55) always holds.
Remark 5: Different from the perfect g Ea case in Section III, θ * can be equal to zero with imperfect CSIg Ea . The AN injected towards the passive eavesdroppers can leak to the active eavesdropper due to imperfect CSIg Ea . For this case, the SOP constraint ε may be small and σ 2 J,Ea is large. In addition, when the SOP for the active eavesdropper is far less than the SOP constraint ε, the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers determines the secrecy rate and θ * = 1/(N − 1), which has no relation with the correlation coefficient ρ Ea . On the other hand, when the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers is far less than the SOP constraint ε, the SOP for the active eavesdropper determines the secrecy rate, and θ * = θ 2 , which has no relationship to the correlation coefficient ρ Ea .
V. MULTIPLE ACTIVE EAVESDROPPERS
The proposed jamming scheme can be extended to the multiple active eavesdroppers case when the number of antennas at the jammer is greater than the number of active eavesdroppers. In the presence of M active eavesdroppers and N passive eavesdroppers available, it is challenging to design the optimal beamforming vector towards the active eavesdroppers. Hence, for the two-fold zero-forcing scheme, MRT is still used for secrecy transmission. Thus, the beamforming vector towards the active eavesdropper is V Ea = W Ea 1 , · · ·, W Ea m , · · ·, W Ea M (1 ≤ m ≤ M ), where W Ea m ∈ C N ×1 denotes the beamforming vector towards the mth active eavesdroppers, and it is written as
For analytical tractability, assume that all the active eavesdroppers have the same statistical CSI, i.e., σ 2 J,Ea m = σ 2 J,Ea . Then, the AN power P J A for the active eavesdroppers is equally allocated to the directions of all active eavesdroppers. In addition, since the AN towards the m th active eavesdropper can leak to the mth passive eavesdropper, different from the single active eavesdropper case, the SNR at the mth active eavesdropper is given by Then, λ 7 +λ 8 ∼ χ 2 (2(N + M − 2)). Thus, the ratio λ 1 /2 (λ 7 +λ 8 )/(2(N +M −2)) follows an F -distribution having (2, 2(N + M − 2)) degrees of freedom, which is denoted by F (2,2(N +M −2)) , and the CDF of γ Ea m is given by
According to (34) , the secrecy outage probability for the active eavesdroppers is given by
where selection combining is applied at the active eavesdroppers. In addition,
should lie in the null-space of [g B , W Ea ]. Similar to the single active eavesdropper case, the AN for the active eavesdroppers will leak to the passive eavesdroppers. Then, the SNR at the kth passive eavesdropper is rewritten as
where
J,E k ). Similar to (8) , the CDF of γ E k can be rewritten as
Then, the secrecy outage probability for the passive eavesdroppers is rewritten as
Substituting (35) and (38) 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed secure transmission scheme for different system parameters. Without loss of generality, we assume R b = 8 bit/s/Hz in this section. The total transmission power P max and transmission power at the active eavesdropper P Ea are, respectively, normalized by the noise variance, and denoted asP max andP Ea in the following simulations, i.e.,P max = P max /N 0 andP Ea = P Ea /N 0 .
In addition,γ A,B = σ 2 A,B /N 0 ,γ A,Ea = σ 2 A,Ea /N 0 ,γ A,E k = σ 2 A,E k /N 0 , andγ Ea,B = σ 2 Ea,B /N 0 denote the normalized channel quality of Alice → Bob, Alice → E a , Alice → E k , and E a → Bob links, respectively. Similarly,γ A,B = σ 2 A,B /N 0 ,γ A,Ea = σ 2 A,Ea /N 0 ,γ A,E k = σ 2 A,E k /N 0 denote the normalized channel quality of the Jammer → Bob, Jammer → E a , and Jammer → E k links, respectively. Figure 2 compares the maximum secrecy rate for the proposed scheme and the traditional AN scheme, where the power P max − P A is uniformly allocated to the N − 1 dimensions [10] , [11] , [40] . To illustrate the effect of the active eavesdropper, we assume one active eavesdropper and K passive eavesdroppers in the proposed schemes and only K+1 passive eavesdroppers in the conventional scheme. In addition, we aasume an equal power allocation scheme with the twofold zero forcing beamforming as another benchmark. To compare the three schemes explicitly and fairly, we assume thatγ A,Ea =γ A,E k andγ J,Ea =γ J,E k when the active eavesdropper and the passive eavesdroppers coexist. In addition, we assume that the SOP in the conventional scheme is less than ζ = ε 2 . It can be seen that the achievable maximum secrecy rate for the proposed scheme is larger than its values for both conventional scheme and equal power allocation scheme.
This shows the superiority of our proposed algorithm. Moreover, the three curves become almost flat for larger N . This shows that for a given beamforming and power allocation scheme, the impact of N on secrecy rate is limited when N is large.
The secrecy rate for different values ofγ J,E k is illustrated in Fig. 3 . It is clear that with different SOP constraints, the secrecy rate for the proposed scheme is still better than its value for the conventional scheme. Moreover, the gap between the two schemes becomes large when the SOP constraint decreases. The advantage of the proposed scheme is obvious when the SOP constraint is more strict. In addition, we can see that the secrecy rate for the four cases approaches R b whenγ J,E k goes to infinity. This is because whenγ J,E k =γ J,Ea and both of them parameters approach infinity, all eavesdroppers in the four curves cannot correctly decode the information, and the secrecy performance can be guaranteed regardless of the AN power allocation between the active eavesdropper and the passive eavesdroppers. This corresponds to the extreme scenario when all the eavesdroppers are close to the jammer and far away from Alice.
The impact of ρ B on the secrecy rate is presented in Fig. 4 , where the maximum achieved secrecy rate increases with ρ B . A small ρ B means that more AN will be leaked to Bob, and more power is required by Alice to satisfy the transmission quality requirement. As a result, the power allocated to AN is decreased, the interference at all eavesdroppers is decreased, and the maximum supported secrecy rate is decreased. In addition, similar to the perfect CSI case, the secrecy rate increases with N .
The impact of ρ B on the optimal power ratio θ * is plotted in Fig. 5 , where we observe that θ * decreases withγ J,Ea , because the SOP for the active eavesdropper decreases withγ J,Ea . The
Optimal θ * is determined by SOPs for both the active and passive eavesdroppers. In this figure, the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers is always satisfied. Whenγ J,Ea is large, little power is required by the active eavesdropper to satisfy the SOP constraint and θ * decreases. In addition, θ * decreases with ρ B because a large ρ B means that little power is leaked to Bob and the power allocated to Alice is decreased. As a result, more power can be allocated to AN and θ * decreases.
Moreover, when ρ B = 1, θ * always decreases withγ J,Ea and approaches zero, but can not equal zero, which coincides with Remark 2. Figure 6 illustrates the impact of ρ Ea on the secrecy rate for different values ofγ J,E k . When γ J,E k is small, the three curves converge for different values of ρ Ea , but whenγ J,E k is greater than 6 dB, these three curves begin to separate. Whenγ J,E k is greater than 15 dB, the three curves become flat because the secrecy rate is determined by the SOPs for both the active and passive eavesdroppers. When the active eavesdropper is far away from the jammer, the secrecy rate is only determined by the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers. Hence, the secrecy rates for the three different correlation coefficients are the same due to poor channel quality between the jammer and the passive eavesdropper. On the contrary, the secrecy rate is determined by the SOP for the active eavesdropper when the channel quality between the jammer and the passive eavesdroppers is good. In this case, though the AN towards the passive eavesdroppers leaks to the active eavesdropper, the MRT for the active eavesdropper cannot be guaranteed due to imperfectg Ea . Hence, the secrecy rate increases with ρ Ea at largeγ J,E k . These results support
The secrecy rate for different values ofγ J,Ea is plotted in Fig. 7 . Different from Fig. 6 , when σ 2 J,Ea is small, the secrecy rate increases with ρ Ea , but the three curves converge whenγ J,Ea is larger than 8 dB. The reason for this behavior is similar to Fig. 6 . Since for largeγ J,Ea , ρ Ea has no relationship with the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers and the secrecy rate is only determined by the SOP for the passive eavesdropper, the three curves have the same maximum secrecy rate. By contrast, whenγ J,Ea is small, the SOP for the active eavesdropper determines the maximum secrecy rate.
The optimal θ * is plotted againstγ J,E k in Fig. 8 . Whenγ J,E k is small, the optimal θ * for different ρ Ea have the same value of 1/(N − 1) = 0.25. As in this case, the SOP for the active eavesdropper is always less than that for the passive eavesdroppers. As a result, the maximum secrecy rate is determined by the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers, and the optimal θ * for the maximum secrecy rate is 1/(N − 1). In addition, θ * increases withγ J,E k because in thisγ J,E k range, the optimal θ * satisfies the SOP constraints for both the active and passive eavesdroppers.
On the one hand, whenγ J,E k goes to infinity and ρ Ea = 1, we can see that the optimal θ * becomes flat. In this case, the maximum secrecy rate is determined by the SOP for the active eavesdropper, and the optimal θ * is the optimal solution of SOP for the active eavesdropper.
Note that there are sudden changes in the curves for ρ Ea = 0.6 and ρ Ea = 0.8, which implies that with the increase ofγ J,E k , the maximum achieved secrecy rate is dominated by the SOP of the active eavesdropper. On the other hand, whenγ J,E k goes to infinity and ρ Ea = 1, the optimal θ * approaches unity but cannot equal unity. In this case, the maximum secrecy rate is determined by the SOP for the active eavesdropper, which is a monotonous decreasing function of θ. As a result, θ * approaches unity. These results agree with Remark 2 and Remark 4 in Section IV.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a two-fold zero-forcing jamming and beamforming scheme for secrecy transmission in the presence of both active and passive eavesdroppers. By taking the instantaneous CSI between the jammer and the active eavesdropper into account, the proposed scheme can achieve better secrecy performance than the conventional AN scheme with beamforming and can be adopted in practice with low complexity. In addition, imperfect CSI between the jammer and the legitimate receiver will do more harm to the achievable secrecy rate than imperfect CSI between the jammer and the active eavesdropper. Moreover, we generalized the proposed scheme to the multiple active eavesdroppers case when there is enough number of antennas at the jammer.
APPENDIX A SOP FOR ACTIVE EAVESDROPPER WITH IMPERFECT CSIg Ea
Due to imperfect CSIg Ea , the SNR at the active eavesdropper is written as
is an idempotent matrix,
. Thus,W H Eag Ea can be rewritten as [41] - [43] 
Substituting (40) 
Note that z 2 follows a central chi-square distribution having 2(N − 1) degrees of freedom, and the MGF of z 2 is E (−z 2 s) = (45)
According to (41) , (42) , (44) , and (45), the CDF ofγ Ea is calculated as Fγ Ea (y) = Pr (γ Ea ≤ y)
In addition, the SOP for the active eavesdropper is given by
Substituting (46) into (47), we can obtain the exact expression of p so 1 in (29).
APPENDIX B
IMPACT OF ρ Ea , R s , P A , AND θ ON p so 1 WITH IMPERFECT CSIg Ea According to (29) , the derivative of p so 1 w.r.t. ρ Ea is given by
We find from (48) that ∂Pso 1 ∂ρ Ea < 0, which means that P so 1 decreases with ρ Ea . Similarly, we can verify that the derivative of p so 1 w.r.t. P A , 
Hence A (θ) > 0 and J (θ) determines whether ∂P so1 ∂θ is greater than zero or not. Fortunately, J (θ) is a quadratic polynomial in θ. Therefore, the minimum value of J (θ) is given by
It is clear that min (J (θ)) < 0. When θ = − 1 2α(1−ρ 2 Ea ) + 1 2(N −1) , min (J (θ)) is also less than unity. In addition, when J (θ) = 0, we have . It is clear that θ 1 < 0 and θ 2 > 0. Next, we will examine the range of θ 2 .
If θ 2 > 1, we have 2Λ + 4 (N − 2) ρ 2 Ea (1 + Λ) + 4 (N − 1) 2 − 3 > 0.
Since θ 1 < 0 and the optimum solution of J (θ) is less than unity, J (θ) < 0 (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1) when (55) is satisfied. Otherwise, 0 < θ 2 < 1. In this case, J (θ) > 0 (θ 2 ≤ θ ≤ 1) and J (θ) < 0 (0 ≤ θ ≤ θ 2 ). According to the analysis above, Lemma 2 is obtained.
